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The Argentine Great Depression
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to comprehend the business cycle of the Argentine Crisis (1998-2002). The
following paper will outline the crisis, starting off with a comprehensive literature review on the topic,
analyzing its causes and consequences, followed by a survey on the policy-responses undertaken by the
Argentine government to combat the recession. The crisis will then be analyzed in the context of the ISLM model of macroeconomics.
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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to comprehend the business cycle of the Argentine Crisis (1998-2002). The following
paper will outline the crisis, starting off with a comprehensive literature review on the topic, analyzing its causes
and consequences, followed by a survey on the policy-responses undertaken by the Argentine government to
combat the recession. The crisis will then be analyzed in the context of the IS-LM model of macroeconomics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
By the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th, Argentina was an economic powerhouse. Rich in natural
resources, economically successful, with GDP that rivaled European counterparts such as Germany and France, it
was an inspiring development story in progress. Nowadays, the story is much different. Argentina’s GDP per
capita (PPP) is of $20.2001, different from the German $48.200 or the $42.400 made by the French. What caused a
promising young nation to go astray and even fall behind some of its Latin-American neighbors? The causes are
multiple. They arise from government instability (Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini 1996), leading to poor fiscal and
monetary policy. Until this day, Argentina has lived through multiple recessions and periods of hyperinflation, all
of which have turned this 19th century powerhouse into an economic miscarriage. This paper explores one of those
appalling events: the 1998-2002 crisis that swept Argentina into one of the most disastrous recessions of its history.
During the 80s, hyperinflation was soaring in Argentina, reaching levels of 3079% in 19892. In response, a
currency board was enacted—fixing the exchange rate to try to control inflation—fixing the peso to the US dollar.
The policy seemed to work, and there was a tad of optimism looking into the 21st century. Nonetheless,
international economic conditions proved Argentina wrong. Brazil devalued its currency, making Argentinian
goods uncompetitive in the international market. High fiscal budgets raised the interest rate to discouraging levels
for investors. Argentina was starting to bury itself into a recession. Considering the economic situation and the
artificially appreciated Argentinean Peso, the IMF decided not to support Argentina, terminating any hopes of a
bail-out. A devaluation of the Peso seemed logical, leading to a major-bank run3 as Argentinians tried to get the
most US dollars out of their Pesos. And so, Argentina found itself in a recession that, at least in the local level,
many consider as severe as the Great Depression. It had catastrophic results: almost 20 years of economic growth
1

The World Factbook. Report. Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
2
Corden, W. Max. "Exchange Rate Policies for Developing Countries." The Economic Journal 103, no. 416 (1993): 198.
doi:10.2307/2234346.
3
"Countdown to disaster." The Economist. March 30, 2002. Accessed May 10, 2017.
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where lost4, the amount of people living under the poverty line was of 52% in 2002, and after a default, Argentina
lost much needed credibility in the international markets.
The following paper will outline the crisis, starting off with a comprehensive literature review on the topic,
analyzing its causes and consequences, followed by a survey on the policy-responses undertaken by the Argentine
government to combat the recession. The crisis will then be analyzed in the context of the IS-LM model.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Due to its unprecedented scale, the Argentine crisis from 1998-2002 has been the subject of a vast body of
economic literature. However, there is a clear divide on what subparts of the crisis economists decided to research.
The dissociation could be summarized as follow:
The effects of the crisis: While an important subfield of economics is devoted to understanding the causes
of a recession, as a vague of emerging countries defaulted at the beginning of the 21st century, scholars started to
investigate the social and economic cost of a crisis. For example, Bozzoli and Quintana (2014)5 showed that the
birth weight of children from less educated background was heavily correlated with macroeconomic fluctuations.
As interestingly, Cavagnero and Bilger (2009), demonstrated that the Argentine public healthcare system
disproportionately decreased in efficiency depending on the income-group of the patient, thus leading to a higher
level of inequality6.
The end of currency-exchange: Bajaras et al. (2007), in a working paper for the IMF showed that the
banking system was not uniformly affected by the end of the U.S. Dollar party. Depositors were able to determine
4

The Argentine Crisis 2001/2002. Report. RaboResearch - Economic Research, Rabobank.
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/the-argentine-crisis-20012002-/.
5
Bozzoli, Carlos and Climent Quintana-Domeque. "The Weight of the Crisis: Evidence from Newborns in Argentina." Review
of Economics and Statistics, vol. 96, no. 3, July 2014, pp. 550-562. EBSCOhost, doi:www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest.
6
Cavagnero, Eleonora and Marcel Bilger. "Equity during an Economic Crisis: Financing of the Argentine Health System."
Journal of Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 4, July 2010, pp. 479-488. EBSCOhost,
doi:www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676296
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the institutions that were the most likely to be at risk. As a result, despite facing the same macroeconomic scenario,
comparable banks were affected by varying degrees. Another study from Betty (2010) was able to apply a model
linking fiscal solvency with currency exchange rate to explain the sudden fall of the pesos during the crisis7.
The restructuring of the debt: A common belief in international market is that crisis in one country
increases the likelihood of crisis in a different country. However, Melisso (2005) demonstrated by studying the
argentine crisis in the context of other crisis among developing countries that the concept of contagion was simply
nonexistent. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2011) were able to successfully predict that the likelihood of a debt default
among Latin America by looking at closing Credit Default Swaps rates thus allowing both investors and policymakers to forecast financial markets’ behaviors8.

3 CAUSES OF THE RECESSION
Argentina has had a history of turbulent economic, political and monetary problems. The country
experienced rapid economic growth during the periods of early 1900s, mainly due to an enormous increase in
exports of goods to the European market. However, due to frequent structural changes in the type of government,
the country has for long suffered from unstable political and economic situation. Prior to 1999, the Peso was
pegged to the USD in response to the ongoing hyperinflation. The successful growth of the real GDP to 10.3% in
1992 led to an overly optimistic view of the country’s future growth potential.

9

However, with major economic

changes in other countries, the repercussions on the Argentine economy did not end too well. The policy decision
regarding fixed exchange rate caused a major problem later, that triggered the economic crisis of 1999-2002. 10 As

7

Daniel, Betty C. "Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 42, no. 6, Sept.
2010, pp. 1109-1135. EBSCOhost, doi:onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291538-4616/issues.
8
Chen, Yi-Hsuan, et al. "Default Correlation at the Sovereign Level: Evidence from some Latin American Markets." Applied
Economics, vol. 43, no. 10-12, April-May 2011, pp. 1399-1411. EBSCOhost, doi:www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20.
9
Geithner , Timothy. Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina . Publication. Policy Development and Review Department ,
International Monetary Fund. Oct. & nov., 2003. https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf.
10
Saxton, Jim. “ARGENTINA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES”. Publication. Joint Economic Committee, United

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018

5

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 24

the economy of the United States became stronger and stronger, USD began appreciating relative to Peso. This led
to a fall in the Argentine exports as these goods became more expensive than before. The repercussions of the East
Asian currency crisis furthered the likelihood of a recession in the country. Brazil, which was Argentina’s largest
trading competitor, devalued the Real from 1.21 per dollar to 2.18 per dollar. Due to the depreciation of the
Brazilian currency, Argentine products were substituted, and investors and buyers found their dollars could buy
more in Brazil than in Argentina. Figure 1.1 illustrates the impact of changes in the Net Exports on the Aggregate
Demand and Aggregate Supply graph.

Figure 1.1

Due to a reduction in exports, the Aggregate Demand curve shifts left, thereby reducing overall price level
and real GDP of the economy. This signaled the contraction of the economy.
Additionally, policy decisions taken by the government of Carlon Menem focused on extensive borrowing
for the sake of increasing spending, something that costed the country a lot in the long run. Table 1 illustrates the
States Congress. Accessed June 2003. http://www.stockssite.com/en/argentina.pdf.
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annual government expenditure (as a % of GDP) by the Argentine government from years 1993-2001.11
Table 1: Annual Government Expenditure (as % of GDP)

1993
19.0

1994
19.9

1995
19.6

1996
20.1

1997
20.1

1998
20.3

1999
21.9

2000
22.1

2001
23.2

Due to extensive borrowings by the government during the periods of 1995-2001, the total government
expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 19.6 % in 1995 to 23.2% in 2001. Eventually, the government
acquired a lot of debt which soared domestic interest rates. In the 1990s, the government of Menem enforced a
system of free enterprise that stimulated a wave of privatization. However, his led to additional problems with
regards to unemployment. Around 1998, real wages lost roughly 36% of their purchasing power and
unemployment climbed to its highest point since the Great Depression.

12

The main problem came when all these

changes began having micro level impact. Due to privatization of many sectors, costs of basic services such as the
electricity and phones spiraled upwards causing inflation in the economy. Argentina was clearly in a recession by
this time. The debt burden along with the shrinking tax revenues, signaled economic slowdown in the country, and
made IMF decide to not bail the country out.

4 POLICY RESPONSE
4.1 DEBT
After three years of continuous recession and month-long riots throughout the country, on the 26th
December 2001 the Argentine government publicly announced that it was unable to pay back a total of $85 billion
to its creditors, that is the largest sovereign debt default in history. As a result, the quasi totality of foreign

11

Geithner , Timothy. Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina . Publication. Policy Development and Review Department ,
International Monetary Fund. Oct. & nov., 2003. https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf.
12
Agencies, Staff And. "Timeline: Argentina's economic crisis." The Guardian. December 20, 2001. Accessed May 10, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/20/argentina1.
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investment inflow ceased, financial markets devalued the pesos to a fourth of its pre-default value, and inflation
rose by an estimated 40%. It is believed that the starting point of what would soon become an unprecedented
economic turmoil is the inability of the government to meet its financial obligations. In order to understand why
such a difficult political decision was made, one has to understand the reasons that lead the government to decide
to not repay its debt.
For Miguel Kegel, a former undersecretary of finance of Argentina, two main elements can provide an
explanation13. First, to restore its competitiveness and solvency, the government attempted to self-induce domestic
deflation while decreasing its budget deficit. This policy was intended to put downward pressure on prices while
allowing the government to partially repay its debt to international creditors. However, the impossibility to devalue
its currency due to a 1-to-1 peg with the American dollars embedded in the law and a strong resistance from the
middle-class to decrease real wages led to a failure of this policy. Second, a significant share of short-term
liabilities throughout the argentine banking system was expressed in U.S. dollars whereas most liquidity held by
banks were labelled in pesos. This undoubtedly put the economy at risk of a run-on banks. Without an international
lender of last resorts to cover for the lack of American liquidity, it was virtually impossible for banks to cover the
totality of their deposits in dollars. Facing an important pressure from the street as well as an ever accumulation of
debt coming from abroad, the government decided to default on its external debt and lifted the American dollar
parity.
The expected chaos that would follow did happen. Due to a complete freeze in transaction expressed in
dollars without authorization from the central bank, hospitals to local shops soon became unable to access a vast
array of foreign goods ranging from medicines to Chilean salmon14. The entire chain of payment between
customers, business, and suppliers broke down further worsening the economic crisis. Nonetheless, as soon as the
13

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_argentina_kiguel.pdf
"A decline without parallel." The Economist. March 02, 2002. Accessed May 11, 2017.
http://www.economist.com/node/1010911.
14
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default of the debt was pronounced a large-scale plan of debt-restructuring was put in place. A large portion of the
external debt was owned by private citizens in Europe who had invested their savings in debts funds. However,
while 93% of the bondholders accepted a reduced payment of their investment, nearly 7% of the creditors, as
defined by the quantity of debt owned, decided to sue the argentine government for a full repayment. Among them
were mostly hedge-funds and vulture funds15. Many of these court cases are still even unsettled today. During the
crisis and its aftermath, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was heavily criticized for its lack of support to the
government. Despite several attempts from Argentina, the IMF refused to offer the liquidities the country
desperately needed. Even after the crisis passed, the IMF made sure that its initial loan was fully repaid despite
some precedents of laissez-faire during similar cases.
Thanks to a prolonged period of sustainable economic growth Argentina decided in 2005 to refinance for a
second time its debt. During this process, most of the bonds were linked to GDP growth which would allow the
government to meet its payment only if the economy brought enough budget surplus to do so. Along this process
numerous investors including countries such as Venezuela and private banks decided to buy back a total of $62.5
billion of debt therefore ending the sovereign debt crisis.

4.2 EXCHANGE RATE
The Argentinian Peso had been pegged to the dollar on a one to one basis. By 2001, it had been so for
almost a decade. The policy was rooted in what seemed sound monetary policy. In 1990, inflation was soaring at a
rate of 2,314% a year. By 1994, it had been stabilized to 4% a year16. But in the late 90s, the policy proved
disastrous. As the US dollar rightfully strengthened, so did the Peso. The East Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian
crisis of 1998 made foreign investors especially wary of developing countries. Foreign investment decreased, and
15

"Argentine Funds Can't Be Seized by Bond Holders, Judge Says". Bloomberg. March 28, 2012. Retrieved August 29, 2013.
Weisbrot, Mark, and Luis Sandoval. Argentina’s Economic Recovery Policy Choices and Implications . Report.
Center for Economic and Policy Research. October 2007.
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/argentina_recovery_2007_10.pdf Bozzoli, Carlos and Climent Quintana16

Domeque. "The Weight of the Crisi
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with the Argentinian Peso pegged to a high dollar, it became too expensive to conduct business in Argentina, or
buy Argentinian goods. Brazil, with a floating exchange rate, was far more competitive. This was one of the drivers
of the recession, and the situation was unsustainable. With a devaluation on sight, the government enacted a
“corralito” to avoid a major bank-run from Argentinians trying to get the most out of their dollars, that is all bank
transactions were frozen and limited to a weekly amount.
As the country prepared for a devaluation, the government fixed and official exchange rate before letting it
float. All bank accounts held in Dollars would be exchanged to Pesos on a 1.4 Pesos/USD rate. There was an
international outcry, leading to sues against the government.17 The extent of this policy can be better understood
when one looks at the nominal exchange rate in 2002. One dollar was now worth 3.6 pesos. The exchange rate
proved propitious for exports; soon after the devaluation, there was a spike in Argentine exports. The devaluation
generated serious inflationary pressures on the economy—matter that will be further developed in the next
section—and the Argentinian government constantly intervened in the markets to balance the exchange rate. First,
it tried to combat inflation by dampening the Peso devaluation. But soon after, as exports increased and the Peso
appreciated, it started intervening in the opposite direction. The goal was to stabilize the exchange rate and
promote consumption and investment. The policy worked. Consumption and investment were the main drivers of
the recovery.

4.3 INFLATION
Major volatility in the exchange rate of Peso during the Argentine crisis had enormous impacts on the
inflation in the economy. The devaluation of the currency had caused a significant spike in the inflation rate to
more than 28% annually. Argentina reached a point where it was on the verge of hyperinflation in an attempt to
control fiscal and monetary policies. As explained before, the government realized the importance of the stability

17

"Argentina loses $1.3bn debt court appeal." BBC News. August 25, 2013. Accessed May 10, 2017.
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23832247.
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of nominal exchange rates in order to stabilize inflation and the financial system overall. By 2005, the country had
successfully been able to recover. However, the prolonged economic expansion strained the industrial capacity that
essentially led to a dramatic drop in the employment rate. According to the 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI)
reports, during the third quarter of 2005, the CPI for Argentine goods spiked to 2.6% quarter of quarter. This
suggested inflationary pressures on the economy.

18

As a result, the Argentine government, yet again, chose to

enforce diametrically opposite policy implications that led to re-centralization of government control over the
market. It directly controlled prices and set stringent regulations on the export of goods in order to sustain prices at
low levels. In the short-run, this decision proved to be fruitful in tackling the problem of exorbitant inflation rates,
however the long-run results seem uncertain, given the frequent change in the government of the country.

5 CONSEQUENCES
After four rough years of economic instability, Argentina finally started getting matters under control. Just
three months after having a $100 billion debt default, the Argentine economy began growing rapidly. With more
than 50% GDP growth, the country became the fastest growing economy in the West. One of the major decisions
taken by the government in order to end the crisis was to overturn the policy regarding the Peso beings fixed at a
one-to-one exchange rate with the dollar.

19

The exchange rate fixation had caused unbearable burden for the

economy over the years, and so with the help of large scale protests in January 2002, the convertibility system was
formally abolished. However, three months out of the recession, the Argentine economy was still in financial
disarray. It was only due to the massive devaluation of the Pesos against the dollar in 2002, that opportunities for
exports re-appeared and the economy finally expanded. The new range of 1.4 to 3.7 pesos per dollar also boosted
import based industries in the country. Eventual increase in private consumption and investment that followed up
18

Solutions, EIU Digital. "EIU Store." Argentina Country Risk. Accessed May 10, 2017.
http://store.eiu.com/product.aspx?pubid=820001082.
19
Weisbrot, Mark, and Luis Sandoval. Argentina’s Economic Recovery Policy Choices and Implications. Publication. CEPR,
Center for Economic and Policy Research. Oct. & nov. 2007.
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/argentina_recovery_2007_10.pdf.
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from the export boost, caused the rest of the recovery of the economy. Figure 1.2 illustrates the recovery process of
the Argentine economy.

Figure 2.2

By 2005, the Argentine government was successful in restoring both foreign as well as domestic
investment credibility. Due to a considerable pressure from the IMF to provide better financial terms post the debt
default crisis, the government was finally able to arrange a debt swap that took $67.3 billion debt off the records.
Additionally, the Argentine government’s willingness to accept an annual inflation rate of more than 28% post the
devaluation of Pesos helped stabilize the nominal exchange rate and led to an extensive growth rate. By 2005 the
Argentine economy had fully recovered and was growing extensively. Total spending increased dramatically (by
4.6% points of GDP) with the current account being in surplus. Thus, Argentina’s recovery from one of its worst
recessions was truly rapid.
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6 CONCLUSION
The Argentine crisis of 1998-2002 is known as the Argentine Great Depression. Such a reference, to
one of the most devastating economic crisis of modern time, seems appropriate. GDP contracted by 28%, the
per capita measurement regressed 20 years. Unemployment reached a peak level of 20%. The number of people
living under the poverty line—as defined by the Argentine government—was 52%; 25 out of every 100
Argentinians were considered indigent20. The crisis had unprecedented repercussions for what seemed a
promising Argentine economy.
The crisis is an example of seemingly good policy gone wrong. Having a currency board seemed a
reasonable measure to combat hyperinflation. In fact, it worked, allowing Argentina to have high levels of
growth during the 90s, and generate enough confidence in their bonds to emit high levels of debt. But
eventually, a Peso pegged to the dollar casted a gloomy shadow over Argentina. The crisis also exemplifies the
dangers of sustaining a large government deficit over a prolonged period. A large deficit coupled with
uncompetitive exports led Argentina into one devastating recession.
The present investigation has analyzed the Argentinean Great Recession in the context of the aggregate
supply and aggregate demand models. As explained, the fall in exports and the burdensome government deficit
shifted the aggregate demand curve to the left, decreasing output and generating a recession. The government
response, letting the peso float and reducing the deficit, allowed for a recovery in both the export economy and
in consumption and investment, both of which increased aggregate demand and shifted the AD curve back to its
pre-crisis level. After such a far-reaching recession, it comes into question whether Argentina has learned from
its mistakes. Is Argentina’s potential still there to achieve? And if so, will Argentina ever achieve it?21

20

Cruces, Guillermo, and Quentin Wodon. "Argentina’s Crises and the Poor, 1995-2002 ." Distributional Analysis
Research Programme , July 2003. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/93952.pdf.
21
For further reading on Argentina’s current state see: "Down Argentina Way." The New York Times. May 03, 2012.
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